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After 9/11, a copious literature emerged on the problem of contemporary 
international terrorism. In particular, the tight intermingling of religious 
fanaticism and mass violence, as epitomized by al Qaeda, led many to speculate 
on the essence of this phenomenon. As a result, terms like terrorism and 
asymmetric warfare are now widely recognized as “high concepts”.  
Needless to say, terrorism is also a key issue from a policy-oriented 
perspective. As the frequency and lethality of terror attacks clearly shows, the 
threat posed by organizations like al Qaeda is far from transitory. Quite the 
contrary, as some noted1, this kind of “asymmetric warfare” seems to be a 
defining feature of the current security context. As a result, any state’s security 
agenda should be broadened to include counter-terrorism among its top 
priorities. For sure, the damage suffered after 9/11 made the U.S. the most 
active supporter of a full-fledged war on terror. What is worth noting, though, is 
that other states, albeit victims of terror attacks, developed different strategies 
to fight terrorism – as it is the case with European states, which explicitly 
declined the military option in their own fight against terrorism2.  
The aim of this article is to interpret al Qaeda’s modus operandi in the 
light of the economic theory of contests3.The main idea expressed here is that al 
Qaeda can be considered as a firm (whose CEO is Osama bin Laden)4 rewarding 
an indivisible prize – namely, official membership – and affiliated groups 
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compete with each other to win the prize. As we will see, this logic has various 
pros and some cons. In order to devise an effective counterstrategy, Western 
counties should target the key elements of such a contest: al Qaeda’s 
communication strategy and the prize setting.  
This brief article is divided into three sections. The next paragraph will 
describe al Qaeda’s main features. The underlying idea is that with respect to 
previous terrorist groups al Qaeda is characterized by original attributes that 
makes it a much more dangerous and elusive threat. Section two presents some 
insights drawn from economic theory of contests, in order to account for al 
Qaeda’s relationship with its cells. Eventually, section three will briefly discuss 
some tentative strategies to counter-terrorism. 
 
Why is al Qaeda different from previous terrorist organizations? 
If compared to traditional terrorist groups, al Qaeda displays several elements 
of novelty. Among its defining features, Audrey Kurt Cronin suggests four main 
characteristics: (a) fluid organization, (b) methods of recruitment, (c) financing 
instruments and (d) the use of communication media5. While all of them are 
relevant when it comes to framing a sound counterstrategy, for the purposes of 
our analysis it is critical to focus our attention exclusively on the way al Qaeda 
cells are related and interact with each other – i.e. the organizational dimension 
broadly conceived. 
It is this realm that makes terrorists so difficult to hunt down. Indeed, 
thanks to the flexibility embedded in its own structure, al Qaeda is continuously 
evolving, up to the point that “the al Qaeda of September 2001 no longer 
exists”6. In fact, mainly as a consequence of the US-led war on terror, bin 
Laden’s creation proved to be a flexible, agile and resilient structure, able to 
swiftly and effectively adapt and adjust to external pressures. In fact, rather 
than an organization, al Qaeda is closer to the original meaning of the term – i.e. 
a concept, an idea, a mission7. In order to describe its specificity, analysts have 
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coined a plethora of terms: network, group, movement, clique. In other words, 
anything denoting a flexible structure with fuzzy boundaries8. Such an evolution 
is probably the best indicator of al Qaeda’s resilience and extent. As a matter of 
fact, no other terrorist group ever succeeded in developing and managing such a 
complex and smooth organization on a global scale. Especially after the 
evolution initiated in 2001, after the American campaign in Afghanistan 
destroyed the training camps, al Qaeda has basically become the hinge of a 
hybrid terrorist organization, loosely connected to other like-minded groups 
and freelancers9. 
For the whole organization this may potentially constitute a weak point, 
as the command and control mechanisms may be hindered by the lack of a clear 
hierarchical line. Yet, the advantage is clear, and can be measured in terms of 
flexibility and autonomy as well as in terms of resilience to penetration and 
compromise10. The main problem with this kind of structure, therefore, is for 
counter-terrorism. On one hand, hunting down al Qaeda’s leaders is almost 
impossible; on the other hand, loose and ideological ties allow al Qaeda to 
extend its own membership almost infinitely. It is an evidence of this the 
ongoing (and quite fruitless) debate on the nature, size and width of the 
network. The real problem is that no one really knows how many members are 
currently or have been previously part of al Qaeda11. 
Still, if the organizational setting is so flexible, and ideology (by definition) 
provides just a broad framework of action, what makes al Qaeda hang together? 
Admittedly, given its secret nature, what we can do is just to suggest some 
tentative answers. Yet, recent research provides interesting insights – on which 
most analysts agree – related to recruitment. If there is a loose hierarchical tie 
among cells, a critical question is to discover the defining principle used to 
determine roles and functions within the organization. Put it differently, if the 
bottom-up process is as important as top-down control, what can we say about 
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the recruitment method? How can independent groups become affiliated to al 
Qaeda? How close can they get to the leadership? As discussed in Sageman’s 
volume, individuals (or, more frequently, groups)12 get involved in the 
organization not because pressed by actual al Qaeda members, but mainly as a 
result of a selection process among volunteers competing for a chance to enjoy 
the al Qaeda brand. So, rather than a recruiting process, it seems more 
appropriate to talk about a voluntary application to join the organization13. 
Albeit a conjecture, assume that the number of potential applicants is 
much higher than the promised membership. This situation is especially 
beneficial for al Qaeda for at least three reasons. Firstly, there is no need for bin 
Laden and his fellows to invest resources in any recruitment drive. Secondly, 
and most importantly, such an abundance of applications allows al Qaeda to be 
very selective in granting membership. Finally, apart from saving time and 
money, these loose ties help conceal the organization’s structure. The only 
weakness of the self-starters system is that, by virtue of the spontaneous origins 
of would-be terrorists, the command and control capabilities are quite limited. 
As a side effect, therefore, al Qaeda could be evoked and get stuck in actions far 
from the leaders’ main interests. Secondly, and partially related to this last 
point, the potential of ideology as a common denominator should not be 
exaggerated, as the ideological appeal is a necessary, but hardly sufficient 
condition.  
Summing up, the point is that al Qaeda poses a more insidious threat 
than previous terrorist organizations. This is due to its final goal, as well as the 
organizational features of the network. But still, some insight on the internal 
functioning of the organization may provide new grounds for counterterrorist 
policies. In order to proceed in this direction, we now turn to the contribution of 
economic theory of contest.  
It is worth noting that in recent times a different interpretation has been 
proposed. Many observers raised the argument that terrorist cells behave 
according to an open-source mechanism14. This interpretation mainly focuses 
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on the structure of the network. Terrorists would be akin to developers of a free 
Linux-style software. There are some factors which could make this 
interpretation fitting: (a) the lack of a rigid hierarchical structure; (b) the de-
centralized organization of the network; (c) the self-initiative of developers; (d) 
the spontaneous elitist evolution of contributors. However, there are some other 
factors which make such interpretation incorrect.  
Needless to say, in an open-source mechanism, co-developers produce a 
public good15. They can consume this public good and such consumption enters 
positively the utility function of both developers and users. By contrast, terrorist 
cells produce a public bad. They cannot consume the good itself and it cannot 
enter positively any utility function. Looking at the organization of the structure, 
there are also some characters which limit this kind of interpretation. In the 
open-source mechanism the developer faces an opportunity cost of her or his 
time. While developing an open-source project, he or she must give up the 
development of other projects. This is possible because programming skills are 
pervasive and simply signalled. Therefore, developers clearly face a cost. This 
seems not to be the case with terrorists. Since terrorism is a secret activity by 
definition, terrorists would not be engaged in other activities. Terrorist skills are 
not pervasive and, in most cases, they cannot be disclosed. Last but not least, in 
an open-source structure, developers can communicate and interact with each 
other. This does not seem to be the case of terrorist network. As many observers 
believe, communication and interaction among terrorist cells seem very low. 
The insight that could be drawn from open-source interpretation relates 
to the motivations of developers. Open-source is characterized by two distinct 
incentives leading to delayed payoffs: (i) a career concern incentive, namely the 
‘bid’ on future well-paid job offers. (ii) the peer-recognition (something akin to 
academic research). They both fall under the heading of signalling incentive, 
which – according to Lerner and Tirole– strongly relies on: (a) the highest 
possible visibility of performance to the relevant audience, (b) the highest 
possible impact of effort on performance, and (c) the highest perceived causality 
between performance and talent.  
                                                 
15 See Lerner, Tirole (2002).  
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However, the latter considerations do also fit with the economic theory of 
contest which is  expounded in the next paragraph. 
 
Some Insights from Contest Theory 
There is a growing awareness among economists and other social scientists that 
many phenomena can be modelled as contests. A contest is commonly defined 
as a game in which players compete over a prize by making irreversible outlays. 
In other words, contests are situations in which rational agents spend resources 
in order to win a prize. The characteristic feature of this interaction is that 
resources are spent irreversibly. This does constitute the main difference with 
auctions, in which agents do not bear entirely the cost of the bids. This is also 
the rationale to label contests as all-pay auctions16. 
Literature on contests commonly implies the concept of Nash 
equilibrium. A strategy is assumed to be a Nash equilibrium when no player 
involved has any incentive to deviate from it. The emergence of a Nash non-
cooperative equilibrium commonly happens when agents have no opportunity 
of coordination. This is the classical case of prisoner’s dilemma, i.e. where actors 
choose their favourite strategy even if it leads to a sub-optimal result, because 
they are not able to coordinate. The lack of coordination leads to a non-
cooperative equilibrium. In other words, as rational agents, they maximize their 
expected payoff. Albeit it appears trivial, the concept of maximizing agents 
becomes fundamental while analysing agents’ behaviour in contests. Consider 
two simple examples. In a race, athletes cannot coordinate their actions. In the 
presence of an indivisible prize (call this winner-take-all contest) they will put 
their maximum effort to win the prize. In such a case, coordination is clearly not 
feasible. Only one player can become the winner. There is no alternative 
strategy. Agents play à la Nash and maximize their efforts in order to maximize 
their payoffs. In a similar fashion, scholars competing for research grants 
cannot coordinate each other. When grants are assigned on personal basis and 
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there is no opportunity to agree on a pre-determined sharing of the ‘cake’, the 
only feasible strategy is writing the best possible proposal. 
Hereafter we mention some common findings of contest literature that 
might be useful for our analysis. In particular, in our framework we are 
interested in accounting for agents’ behavior and efforts. 
To begin with, the level of effort applied by every agent is strictly 
correlated to the value of the ‘prize’ – i.e. the higher the evaluation of the ‘prize’, 
the higher will be the commitment to put the maximum effort into the contest. 
Second, each agent knows that the probability of winning the contest is 
increasing in its own effort and decreasing in other players’ efforts. That is, in 
the simplest case of two agents A and B, the probability of agent A to win the 
contest is higher when it exerts higher efforts than agent B. Then, the only 
feasible strategy for both A and B will be exerting the maximum possible effort. 
In such a way, each player can attain its maximum payoff. To recapitulate this 
point, contest theory predicts that the maximizing behaviour is the strategy 
applied by each agent. This can also be generalized in the presence of a higher 
number of contestants. In a multi-agents scenario, however, the theory also 
predicts that total efforts decrease in the number of contestants. That is, when 
agents are aware that the contest is joined by more agents, their individual effort 
will decrease, as well as the sum of all individual efforts.  
Of course, these general predictions about agents’ behaviour can be 
considered as ceteris paribus conditions. In general, these properties hold even 
if other factors affect the effectiveness of efforts. For expository reasons, we can 
say that it is possible to indicate two candidate subsets of interacting factors: (a) 
individual characteristics; (b) exogenous characteristics.  
As individual characteristics, consider first the existence of different 
talents and abilities. Individuals as well as groups differ widely in abilities. The 
idea of ability is ‘somehow’ technological. If you consider that a contest can be 
considered nothing but a production function of a monetary reward, then, the 
efforts do constitute the ‘inputs’, whilst the abilities do constitute a technology 
translating a certain level of efforts in probability of success. The impact of 
different abilities is clearer in the presence of a winner-take-all contest. Take 
again the example of the race. Since athletes are expected to put their own 
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maximum efforts into the race, and given that their level of efforts depends 
upon the value of the prize, they would exert the same amount of efforts. In such 
a case, the outcome of the contest will be determined – everything else equal – 
by abilities. Of course, abilities can be exogenously given and refer to personal 
talents given by nature, but they can also be related to some specific positive 
investments undertaken by agents. Still, whatever the case, this does not really 
matter while analysing a contest. If they are not able to update their own 
abilities in different stages of the game, their effort will be fruitless. 
As exogenous conditions, consider the design of the contest. That is, the 
agent that is providing the ‘prize’ of the contest can somehow modify the 
architecture of the contest in order to bear an influence on the total effort 
exerted. The simplest case is that of providing different prizes. This is the 
common case of sport contests where prizes are offered for the winner but also 
for the runner up. Moldovanu and Sela17 offer a brilliant theoretical contribution 
in this respect. They show that in the presence of concave cost functions, only 
one prize is the optimal design which does maximize efforts. By contrast, in the 
presence of convex cost functions different prizes may constitute an optimal 
design. Put differently, when the efforts are increasingly costly – that is when 
the cost increases as the contest goes on – different prizes do constitute an 
optimal choice for the design. In fact, when rational agents know that several 
prizes are provided – given the information available about other contestants’ 
abilities – they will put their maximum effort into the contest. In fact, even if 
they are aware that they cannot win the contest, they also would expend the 
maximum effort to get the other prizes. This is the case of sports as cycling, 
where different prizes are provided by organizer and then the total efforts of 
participants is maximized. By contrast, when the cost function is not convex – 
that it is not increasing in the effort – only one prize leads to the best design. In 
such a case, designer’ objective is also kept. The level of total effort is 
maximized. Setting only one prize guarantees that no player will give up. This is 
true in particular when players do not have information about other contestants’ 
abilities. 
                                                 
17 Moldovanu, Sela (2001). 
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The few lines above were based on the implicit assumption that agents 
involved in a contest are symmetric apart from their own abilities. A difference 
in abilities clearly recalls an idea of ‘asymmetry’ that is common among students 
of political science. Asymmetry however can have different shapes. In the realm 
of strategic interactions, what is also affecting agents’ behaviour is an 
asymmetry of available information. 
The simplest case refers to an asymmetry in the evaluation of the prize. 
That is, without any public disclosure, agents can evaluate differently the ‘prize’ 
of a contest. Since the level of efforts is positively correlated to the value of the 
prize, different evaluations of the stake lead to different levels of efforts between 
agents18. Nti analyses the case of a contest where participants evaluate 
differently the ‘prize’19. The common result of this contribution is that agents 
retaining a higher evaluation of the stake exert more efforts in the contest than 
low-evaluation participants. In particular, Hillman and Riley show that 
asymmetric evaluation deters participation by low-evaluation agents. Consider a 
contest with only two players, A and B, with identical abilities. If A retains a 
higher evaluation of the prize, it  will exert more efforts, and as a consequence 
will be the favorite. Agent B, the ‘Underdog’, will exert fewer efforts. Then, 
increasing the favourite’s valuation increases its effort, but decreases the effort 
of the underdog. This result holds even if the underdog is superior in abilities. 
In fact, it would be possible to demonstrate that even if agent A is less skilled in 
abilities, it will be always the favorite regardless of its inferiority. In other 
words, this states that an asymmetry in the evaluation of the prize can be a 
driving force. To sum up, some inferences drawn from contest theory may apply 
to our framework: 
 
1. All players maximize their own effort; 
2. in the presence of an asymmetry in the evaluation of the prize, low 
evaluation players would give up; 
3. low ability players would also give up; 
                                                 
18 Hillman, Riley (1989). 
19 Nti (1999); Nti, (2004). 
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4. the probability of collusion among players is very low;20 
 
How does al Qaeda fit with the theory expounded above? In this view, al Qaeda 
may be portrayed as a contest organizer providing an indivisible prize to the 
best terrorist group. From time to time, bin Laden and his fellow start a 
competition among groups loosely related to the network. The prize – even if we 
do not have clear evidence – is represented by some sort of ideological blessing 
(being accepted as a full and honourable member of the organization) and 
economic reward21. More important than that, for our purposes, are the insights 
that we can get from contest theory on the way these cells compete with each 
other. 
The key feature shaping this process is given by information. In a sense, 
the term relates to the fact that all the participants are privately informed about 
their abilities – in other words, each groups knows how much it can achieve, but 
ignores the others’ potential. This, in turn, creates a favourable condition for the 
contest designer, since all groups are forced to give their best and maximize 
their efforts. In a second sense, information can be seen as the process used by 
groups to signal their commitment and ability (and, by reverse, as the way bin 
Laden monitors their actions). When it comes to terrorist attacks, monitoring 
and information costs are close to zero: in fact, when a terrorist group bombs an 
embassy or a trade centre with dozen of casualties somewhere in the world, such 
event is extensively broadcasted by international mass media. As a result, the 
link between effort and rewards is quite direct: the greatest effort is supposed to 
guarantee the prize. Or, put it differently, each group knows that in order to win 
the prize it will have to maximize the number of casualties. Moreover, since the 
groups can evaluate differently the prize to be rewarded, a spontaneous 
partitioning between high-ability and low-ability groups is predictable.  
The implication of such a logic is twofold. On one hand, contrary to 
common wisdom, mass killing and the resulting psychological effect is not an 
end in itself, but rather a means for aspiring groups to win al Qaeda’s prize. In 
                                                 
20 However, the possibility of collusion between heterogeneous agents in a contest has been 
analyzed in Caruso (2007). 
21 It is established that al Qaeda has given grants to local groups that devised promising plans for 
attacks. See on the point Bruce Hoffman (2003). 
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this view, target selection – as in case of train stations, malls, hotels – is not just 
the consequence of ideological considerations, but it is rather a matter of tactical 
calculations: these sites host hundreds of appealing targets, easy to strike and 
highly visible in terms of media coverage. A second implication is that, 
according to the model, a terrorist action per se is not enough to automatically 
grant membership. As a sort of ex post franchising22, al Qaeda reaps the benefits 
of the most successful attacks in terms of a huge return of image, while paying 
in turn – all things considered – a very limited cost. 
 
Some Tentative Policy Prescriptions 
Six years after 9/11 the war on terror is well under way. As many analysts 
suggested in the wake of the attacks in New York and Washington, the fight 
against international terrorism is going to be a central element of any state’s 
security policy for many years to come. Yet, as widely recognized, this kind of 
war must be fought on many fronts. A comprehensive grand strategy should 
encompass as many dimensions as possible, from homeland security to foreign 
aid23 Discussing all of them would be of little utility here. Instead, what we hold 
more relevant is to consider how the model presented above may give some of 
these recommendations a theoretical framework. 
Given the role played by information and communication in connecting 
the various nodes in which al Qaeda’s structure articulates, it is first on these 
that counter-terrorism should focus. The meaning of communication is usually 
conceived broadly, and it just refers to the mere use of mass media or the 
Internet by bin Laden and his fellow. For sure, mastering advanced technologies 
proved critical in al Qaeda’s capability to talk to multiple audiences – like 
potential new members, hostile governments and public opinions worldwide. 
However, this perspective blurs the line between internal and external 
communication. Following the model provided by contest theory, instead, what 
is important is the internal front of communication – i.e. the way information 
circulates among various bodies of the organization. As mentioned, for bin 
                                                 
22 See Farah, Finn (2003); Benjamin( 2003). 
23 Audrey Kurth Cronin and James Ludes come to include nine: diplomacy, intelligence, law 
enforcement, military force, the laws of war, psychological-political instruments, foreign aid and 
homeland security. Kurth Cronin, Ludes (2004). 
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Laden most of the advantages of starting contests derive from asymmetrical 
information. Collusion among competing groups is hindered by lack of 
knowledge of each others’ means and intentions; likewise, scarce information on 
the criteria used to allocate the prize forces competing groups to maximize their 
effort. 
Any counterstrategy, therefore, should be aimed at preventing these 
conditions from occurring. In this respect, two broad actions can be undertaken. 
The first one is to discredit bin Laden’s promise. Or, in more sophisticated 
terms, to falsify and confuse the kind of information that candidate terrorists 
receive. It is up to the intelligence community to perform this task. In fact, 
secret services may adopt different instruments to interfere with al Qaeda’s 
communication. This is a very sensitive issue, since evidently the risk involved 
in some intelligence practices for democratic countries is to disregard individual 
freedoms in favour of public security24. However, some action along this line is 
probably necessary to hunt down critical links of the organization. Even though 
these measures brake down only limited portions of the network25, they may 
work out in preventing attacks that require wide, coordinated action. As a result, 
terrorist violence would certainly not be eradicated, but it would be much 
harder for bin Laden to ignite and sustain the competition process among 
groups. 
A second line of action concerns al Qaeda’s means of support. As long as 
bin Laden’s reward to self-starters is money, it is critical to limit al Qaeda’s 
capacity of redistribute it. In economic terms, financial assets have been 
provided in a variety of ways, ranging from charitable organizations to self-
financing through robberies. Indeed, most part of the transactions seems to 
involve limited amounts of money, mostly conceded to local groups by the 
central command. This figure is apparently confirmed by the fact that even the 
most famous and catastrophic attacks proved relatively cheap: just to make a 
few examples, the cost of the 2002 Bali bombing was about $35.000, the attack 
to the USS Cole about $50.000, while 9/11 cost less than half a million dollars26. 
                                                 
24 Wilkinson (2000). 
25 An interesting, though overconfident contribution in this sense is Farley (2003). 
26 International Institute for Strategic Studies (2004, p. 8). 
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Another channel for financing consists in the various autonomous al 
Qaeda-own or controlled companies. “At one point, bin Laden was reputed to 
own or control approximately eighty companies around the world. Many of 
these legitimately continue to earn a profit, providing a self-sustaining source 
for the movement”27. To date, estimates suggest the global efforts to hamper al 
Qaeda financing froze funds for $147 million. As committed as this effort can be, 
it success can hardly be taken for granted. By the light of the limited amount of 
money required to reward the groups, working in this direction opens a series of 
challenges. Still, jamming the logic of contest does not require freezing all al 
Qaeda’s assets. What is important is to deny local groups access to these funds. 
Even if the network can count on an impressive fiscal autonomy, as valuable 
resources will always be available for the organization as a whole, counter-
terrorist strategies may try to oppose it by making its resources of little utility. 
This can be done by breaking down the flow of money at the lowest level of the 
chain – i.e. before it gets in the local groups’ hands. If counter-terrorism will be 
able to deny them their economic reward, bin Laden’s credibility as a contest 
setter will be challenged. 
 
Conclusion 
In the previous paragraphs, we attempted to apply the insights drawn from 
contest theory to explain some of al Qaeda’s most puzzling features. We 
suggested that that one of its main strengths is given by the loose definition of 
membership. As witnessed by the plots unveiled in London and Glasgow in July 
2007, terrorist actions look more like the result of self-starters’ initiatives than 
elaborated, centralized, top-down plans. This practice represents a departure 
from the past – and a truly problematic one. In fact, from a counter-terrorism 
perspective, the rise of autonomous violence-prone groups found Western 
intelligence basically unprepared. In the words of the British Intelligence and 
Security Committee’s Report “We remain concerned that across the whole of 
the counter-terrorism community the development of the home-grown threat 
                                                 
27 Kurth Cronin (2006 p. 37). 
 14
and the radicalization of British citizens were not fully understood or applied 
to strategic thinking”28. 
Nonetheless, such an evolution of al Qaeda should not come as 
unexpected. On one hand, it is coherent with bin Laden’s “vanguardist” vision of 
the network – i.e. his leadership providing inspirational and ideological 
guidance to fellow Muslims willing to join the jihad all over the world. On the 
other hand, such a procedure is extremely appealing, as it allows terrorists to 
maintain a high level of secrecy concerning the organization, as well as to reduce 
the costs involved in terrorist attacks. In fact, by virtue of its loose and multiple 
ties, the network can survive and adapt even when some of its hubs are 
removed. Perhaps more importantly, this bottom-up process provides al Qaeda 
with a cheap and almost unlimited pool of human resources. 
Fortunately, there are also some weaknesses implicit in this system that 
may be used to oppose al Qaeda. The logic of group competition inherent in 
contests makes sense only under given conditions, such as private and 
asymmetric information. Moreover, even if so far this process seemed to be self-
sustaining, action can be undertaken in order to make its effects futile. As 
suggested in the previous paragraph, communication and financial rewards 
could be al Qaeda’s weakest points. Through a careful work of intelligence, links 
between nodes may be severely weakened, with the result of minimizing 
terrorists’ capabilities for large scale attacks. On the second front, counter-
terrorism should track financial flows in order to prevent local groups from 
enjoying the reward for their action. 
Needless to say, the insights suggested in our analysis are limited by the 
lack of reliable information on the network. Especially as concerns empirical 
evidence, we tried to draw some ex post observable implications. In other 
words, since no public confession or statement has been made by al Qaeda 
operatives on bin Laden’s rewarding strategy, we had to focus exclusively on the 
output of the process – obviously, al Qaeda’s attacks. As a consequence of this 
limit, several paths for future research are open. In particular, future analyses 
should investigate in depth the terms of the contest. How does bin Laden 
                                                 
28 Government Response to the Intelligence and Security Committee’s Report into the London 
Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005, May 2006. 
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initiate a contest? How does he select the participants to the contest? How does 
he reward the successful applicants – i.e. what is the weight of ideological 
blessing and monetary remuneration29? Is the contest played simultaneously, or 
do applicants play in sequence until bin Laden’s goal is achieved? Finally, how 
to jam or deter this strategy? 
Admittedly, these questions are beyond the limits of our analysis. 
Perhaps, addressing these questions will require a refining – let alone an 
amendment – of the interpretation presented here.  
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